This paper studies the real-time value of technical and fundamental investment recommendations broadcasted simultaneously on the TV show "Talking Numbers." Considering individual stocks, technicians outperform leading fundamental analysts in predicting upward and downward price movements over investment horizons of one to twelve months. Technicians also deliver a significant alpha with respect to the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks. Regarding market indexes, other equity indexes, Treasuries, and commodities, both technicians and fundamental analysts deliver poor forecasts. The evidence supports the notion that technicians can detect insider buying and selling of individual stocks, whereas fundamental analysis is virtually worthless.
Introduction
This paper employs a novel database from "Talking Numbers" to assess the value of technical and fundamental analyses. Hosted by CNBC and Yahoo, "Talking Numbers" is a TV show that confronts the investment recommendations of leading technicians and fundamental analysts. The show provides a unique setup for understanding the value of financial analysis. In the first place, the head-to-head simultaneous recommendations of technicians and fundamental analysts on the same assets over similar investment horizons establish an ideal laboratory in which to compare the relative worth of the two investment approaches. As both schools of thought are exposed to the same public information during the broadcast, we are able to examine the extent to which technicians and fundamental analysts possess private information and are able to detect insider trading and process the flow of public information effectively.
Moreover, the analysis of dual recommendations is robust to several biases characterizing the studies of analysts' forecasts. First, the show participants are well positioned and thus less prone to experience and reputation concerns (Graham, 1999; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam, 2006) as well as career concerns (Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005) . Second, the simultaneous recommendations eliminate potential cross-herding between analysts. Third, our experiments are fairly robust to data-mining. To our knowledge, we are the first to visit the recommendations broadcasted in "Talking Numbers" as well as the first to assess the performance of technical recommendations, as the vast literature on technical analysis has studied technical rules.
Overall, we study 1620 dual recommendations (1000 recommendations for 262 individual stocks and 620 for other assets). The recommendations cover the largest stocks (e.g., Apple, Google, Exxon Mobil), the most liquid commodities (e.g., gold, oil), the main exchange rates (e.g., the U.S. dollar), the major bonds (e.g., the U.S. ten-year notes), the major equity indexes (e.g., the various Dow Jones indexes) and prominent sectors (e.g., technology, real estate, pharmaceutical). Thus, our experiments are fairly robust to liquidity concerns or the presence of extreme observations. (Panels A and B) and the cumulative payoffs generated by four spread portfolios (Panel C). In particular, we consider buy-minus-sell and strong-buy-minus-strong-sell technical and fundamental portfolios.
[Please insert Figure 1 here]
The evidence shows that technicians display rather impressive stock-picking skills, recommending the purchase of undervalued stocks along with the sale of overvalued stocks, while fundamental analysts provide no value whatsoever. To illustrate, observe from Panel A that the twelve-month CARs of the strong-sell, sell, hold, buy, and strong-buy technical recommendations are -8.13%, -0.59%, -0.10%, 1.56%, and 8.97%, respectively. In contrast, Panel B shows that the CARs attributable to fundamental analysis do not align with the type of recommendation. If anything, the sell recommendations generate higher CARs than the buy recommendations.
Similarly, observe from Panel C that the value of the fundamental buy-minus-sell portfolio is non-positive throughout the entire sample period and the value of the fundamental strong-buy-minus-strong-sell portfolio rotates around zero. In contrast, the value of the two corresponding technical portfolios is positive and tends to increase with the investment horizon.
Specifically, over the sample period, the buy-minus-sell portfolio value is $0.42 for the $1 initial long and $1 initial short positions, recording an annual CAPM alpha of 14.8% (t = 2.35). More prominently, the value of the strong-buy-minus-strong-sell portfolio is $2.30, recording a strikingly large annual alpha of 45.3% (t = 3.58). Accounting for the trading costs upon entering and exiting a position, the threshold cost that would set the alpha of the buy-minus-sell (strongbuy-minus-strong-sell) portfolio to zero is 0.62% (2.91%) per transaction. Of course, such large alphas emerge from a short sample period. Attempting to extrapolate those alphas to considerably longer periods would be excessive. Nevertheless, technical recommendations seem to add value in predicting both upward and downward stock price movements. The latter is perhaps more convincing given the positive trend characterizing financial markets during the sample period.
Further analysis shows that technicians outperform in two dimensions. First, they generate a higher proportion of correct recommendations, whereby a correct recommendation amounts to a buy (sell) recommendation followed by an advancing (diminishing) stock price. Second, they produce higher gains following correct recommendations and lower losses following incorrect recommendations. Consistently, for time horizons ranging from one month to twelve months, positive buy and strong-buy technical recommendations are followed by higher returns than buy and strong-buy fundamental recommendations. Likewise, negative sell and strong-sell technical recommendations are followed by lower returns than the corresponding fundamental recommendations. The success of technicians in picking individual stocks is robust to controlling for common risk factors as well as for firm-level size, book-to-market, volatility, trading volume, and past trends in stock prices. It is also unaffected by the analyst's gender, by the immediate impact of the broadcast on the stock price (which is found to be highly significant), and by reasonable trading costs. As an aside, there are only 10% females among both technicians and fundamental analysts. Within this subsample of female analysts, the evidence also shows significant outperformance of technical recommendations.
We demonstrate that the inability of fundamental analysts to predict future returns of individual stocks is uniform across various industries (excluding services) and across all the equity styles considered, namely size, book-to-market, past return, and volatility. In contrast, technical stock recommendations produce robust predictions for all styles and industries, excluding mining. The failure to predict returns on mining stocks mirrors the inability of all the participants in "Talking Numbers" to predict future commodity prices. In fact, both schools of thought have uniformly failed to predict returns on all the broader asset classes, for example Treasuries, market indexes, and equity sector indexes.
The difference in performance among individual stocks versus broad indexes could be attributable to arbitrage capital in that investable patterns in broad market indexes immediately attract capital and thus are traded away. Moreover, common wisdom suggests that the abilities to process public information effectively or extract private signals from prices and volume mostly characterize individual stocks. Indeed, in his bestseller on technical trading The New Trading for Living, Elder (2014) points out (page 36) that "Charts reflect all trades by all market participants -including insiders. … Technical analysis can help you detect insider buying and selling." Of course, such (illegal) insider trading pertains to individual stocks only.
Three strands of studies are related to our work. The first investigates the value of fundamental recommendations. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that the level of analysts' consensus recommendation provides little value over other investment signals. Stickel (1992) and Womack (1996) document value in revisions of consensus recommendations, while Barber et al. (2001) report the disappearance of that value in the presence of transaction costs. Likewise, Jaffe and Mahoney (1999) and Metrick (1999) exhibit the lack of forecasting value focusing on comprehensive samples of investment newsletters. Here, we show that even considering the elite group of analysts, appealing to the large crowd, fundamental analysts provide no investment value.
The second strand deals with technical rules. Theoretically, Brown and Jennings (1989) and Blume et al. (1994) show that past prices and trading volume could reveal the presence of private information, and Zhu and Zhou (2009) show that combining the moving average with other technical signals improves asset allocations. Empirically, the evidence on the strength of technical analysis is mixed. Brown et al. (1998) show that the Dow rules exhibit some predictive ability. Brock et al. (1992) find that technical rules predict returns on stock indexes. However, such predictability vanishes in the presence of transaction costs, according to Bessembinder and Chan (1998) . Allen and Karjalainen (1999) and Sullivan et al. (1999) do not find substantial value in technical rules, while Lo et al. (2000) show that technical patterns predict stock returns. Han et al. (2013) report profitability based on moving averages, and Neely et al. (2014) show that technical indicators exhibit predictive power for the equity premium. Notably, our paper assesses the value of technical recommendations rather than publicized technical rules. Thus, we consider the possibility that the technicians participating in the show use propriety technical rules.
The third strand examines the immediate impact of media-publicized recommendations. Liu et al. (1990) , Barber and Loeffler (1993) , and Mathur and Waheed (1995) document abnormal returns shortly after the publication of recommendations in the newspaper, and Hirschey et al. (2000) report abnormal returns on the day after the recommendations are posted on the Internet. However, Dewally (2003) detects no market reaction to recommendations posted by a newsgroup on the Internet. Neumann and Peppi (2007) find that the recommendations made by Jim Cramer, the host of the CNBC "Mad Money" program, are followed by abnormal payoffs during the following day, and Busse and Green (2002) find that recommendations broadcasted on the CNBC "Morning Call" and "Midday Call" programs produce abnormal immediate profits within 15 seconds. Relative to these studies, we examine the longer-term value, rather than the immediate impact, of recommendations. Eventually, technical stock recommendations provide value not only for immediate trading, but also for a few months, up to a year, following the broadcast.
Indeed, to our knowledge, we are the first to confront fundamental analysts and technicians. Our setup is unique in that both schools of thought are exposed to the same public information, simultaneous recommendations are made by well-positioned analysts and for similar investment horizons, and the collection of assets covered is comprehensive. A remaining task is to shed more light on the outperformance delivered by technical stock recommendations.
In active asset management, performance reflects stock-picking and benchmark-timing skills, where stock-picking skills could further be attributable to industry and/or style rotation.
Economic theory (e.g., Admati et al. 1986 ) typically formulates skills through the managerial ability to process private signals. Empirically, however, one cannot conclude whether a positivealpha fund manager possesses private information or whether that manager perhaps has the ability to process public information more effectively. Of course, there has always been the badmodel concern. In particular, performance specifications may improperly control for those factors characterizing the risk-return trade-off; further, they are likely to misspecify the nature of time variation in both benchmark loadings and risk premiums, if there is such time variation.
In the context of technical recommendations, we rule out the possibility of market timing, industry rotation, or style rotation. Certainly, technicians fail to predict returns on market, sector, and other broad indexes. Putting aside bad-model concerns, technicians could indeed process public information more effectively through their investment toolkits. As noted earlier, using various charts, technicians can help to detect buying and selling insider (illegal) trading.
Detecting insider buying (selling) helps to predict upward (downward) moves in individual stock prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the nature of the "Talking Numbers" broadcast and the participating analysts as well as the methodology used to convert the content of the show into ultimate investment recommendations. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical findings corresponding to individual stocks. Section 5 extends the analysis to the other asset classes noted earlier. Section 6 concludes. A list of the assets covered in the show and the recommendation classification system are detailed in the appendices.
Methodology
Our technical and fundamental recommendations are extracted from the media broadcast entitled "Talking Numbers." Prior to May 2013, the program was exclusively hosted by the CNBC television network. Since May 2013, CNBC and Yahoo Finance have jointly hosted the show.
According to Yahoo, the broadcast "takes a 360° approach to trading -highlighting the best investment opportunities by analyzing stocks both a technical and a fundamental point of view …." A typical broadcast features assets that make headlines in the financial media. Examples include the stocks of prominent U.S. corporations that are about to post financials, hot sectors, hot markets, and general assets experiencing substantial price fluctuations (e.g., the recent drop in commodity prices and the rise in the U.S. dollar).
The technicians and fundamental analysts participating in the show usually serve as the heads of research or the investment division of highly regarded banks, investment management funds, and research companies, such as Deutsche Bank, Piper Jaffray, Stifel Financial Corp. and Standard & Poor's Investment Advisory Services. Based on browsing through participants' résumés, the typical analyst possesses about twenty years of experience, a position as a managing director or chief officer and nominations in ranking tables for best analysts, portfolio managers or technicians. A significant portion of the participants are at the advanced career stage of founding their own companies.
Fundamental analysis typically starts with a macroeconomic outlook and industry conditions, followed by a recommendation along with supporting discussions. A technician, in most cases, describes a chart of historical prices along with moving averages. He/she then discusses the main technical characteristics underlying the recommendation. Often, there are more supporting charts and even a discussion linking the technical recommendation to fundamental factors. It is common for the technician, the fundamental analyst, and the show hosts to debate the nature of the recommendations.
As noted earlier, the sample spans November 8, 2011 through December 31, 2014.
November 8, 2011 featured the first comparison between technical and fundamental points of view. Beforehand, "Talking Numbers" was a rather different show. It was part of the CNBC broadcast "Closing Bell" and usually featured the view of a single analyst, who mainly discussed the S&P 500 index. In April 2015, the original program was discontinued, and CNBC initiated a new broadcast titled "Trading Nation." This new show exhibits several similarities to "Talking Numbers," including the same host. In addition, several analysts who participated in "Talking Numbers" also take part in "Trading Nation." However, the new format of "Trading Nation" does not formally confront technical and fundamental points of view.
In the first year of the sample, "Talking Numbers" was broadcasted once per trading day, typically featuring four recommendations or two dual recommendations: two distinct assets, each of which is covered by both technicians and fundamental analysts. Then, the program was usually broadcasted several times daily, in most cases each program covering a single asset. In a few cases, the program features only one analyst delivering either a technical or a fundamental point of view, without a comparison. Such single recommendations are excluded from the primary analysis and are later considered when examining the robustness of the results.
We classify technical and fundamental recommendations into five conventional categories, namely "strong buy," "buy," "hold," "sell", and "strong sell." In about 20%-30% of the cases (depending on the asset class), the analyst's formal rating was explicitly stated verbally or in a caption. Then, the classification clearly adhered to the analysts' explicit ratings. In other cases, the recommendation is not explicit. Then, we systematically extract the recommendation category based on the content of the show, as discussed in the next paragraph. We viewed all the programs twice and classified them separately into each of the five recommendation categories.
In most cases, the two classifications were identical. If a mismatch emerged, the program was viewed again and the final classification was then delivered. In either case, the distinction between positive recommendations and negative recommendations is crystal clear.
Appendix A provides the full list of terms characterizing the five recommendation categories, while Appendix B illustrates how specific programs were classified. Below, we provide a comprehensive discussion.
The strong-buy category features distinct and enthusiastic recommendations to buy an asset without any reservation. Any expectation of at least a 20% gain during the coming year (expressed directly or implied by the analyst's price target) falls within this category. The buy category characterizes a buy recommendation with reservations that do not deter anybody from immediately buying the asset, a clearly positive business forecast and the use of positive terms such as "cheap" and "overweight." For example, if an analyst suggests starting to buy the asset and increase buying as a pullback emerges, such an explicit recommendation would be classified as a buy. However, if an analyst recommends waiting for a pullback and only then buying the asset, that contingent recommendation would be classified as a hold.
The strong-sell category consists of distinct recommendations to sell the asset immediately without any reservation, which is occasionally even accompanied by a suggestion to sell it short. Any expectation of at least a 20% price drop during the coming year falls within this category. The sell category features a sell recommendation with reservations that do not deter anybody from immediately selling the asset, a clearly negative business outlook, a distinct "do not buy" statement and the use of terms such as "underperform" and "overbought."
The hold category consists of all recommendations to hold the asset or recommendations featuring assets as "market performing" and "neutral." To avoid subjective judgment biases and misinterpretation, we attribute mixed, contingent, ambiguous, and contradictory recommendations to the hold category. This classification guarantees that the buy and sell categories are unambiguous and transparent.
While the differences between strong-buy and buy and between strong-sell and sell recommendations could be subtle, the distinctions between the buy and the sell groups are clear and well defined. It is unlikely that a positive recommendation would be classified as a sell or a negative recommendation would be classified as a buy. Notably, the main results are qualitatively similar whether we employ the five-category scale, a three-category scale (all buy, hold and all sell), or a two-category scale (all buy and all sell, excluding hold).
Several additional notes are in order. First, we considered only recommendations corresponding to "investment" horizons, ranging from a few months to one year, which are provided in all the programs. However, in a few programs, analysts also provide a separate recommendation for a time horizon of one day or a few days, usually referred to as a "trading" recommendation. Even less common, in a few cases, analysts also provide a long-term forecast for horizons longer than one year (usually three to five years). Such recommendations are exceptional items. Moreover, they are always provided along with the recommendation for the main investment horizon and are usually provided by a single analyst. We discarded short-term and long-term recommendations. Second, while discussions about the market index (S&P 500) often include both negative and positive aspects and tones, single-stock discussions are more distinctive and clear with technical discussions that are typically more transparent and stricter than fundamental ones.
The data
For broadcasts prior to CNBC's merge with Yahoo in May 2013, we approached the broadcasts using two main sources: the CNBC archive at video.cnbc.com and The Internet Archive's TV news research service at archive.org. For that period, we employed several net-searching practices to detect programs that were missing from the main data archives. The main source of programs after the merge is Yahoo Finance at finance.yahoo.com. This source is organized chronologically and contains all the post-merger programs. Overall, we were able to cover the vast majority, if not all, of the "Talking Numbers" recommendations during the sample period. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the broad set of recommendations for single stocks, the market index, particular equity sectors, bonds, commodities, and currencies.
Appendix C presents the full list of all the individual stocks featured in "Talking Numbers" as well as all the other assets. Altogether, we were able to capture 1620 dual recommendations, as detailed below. There are 1,000 technical recommendations and 1,000 fundamental recommendations (1,000 dual recommendations) featuring 262 individual stocks. There are 149 dual recommendations covering the S&P 500 index (the NYSE composite index in one case); 256 dual recommendations corresponding to 58 indexes and ETFs, such as the NASDAQ 100, the Dow Jones Industrial/Utilities/Transportation and particular sectors including banking, retail, homebuilders, miners and biotechnology, as well as non-U.S. markets including emerging markets, frontier markets, and the Nikkei 225; 50 dual recommendations featuring bond yields (mostly 10-year Treasuries but also municipal bonds); 144 dual recommendations about 17 commodities (especially gold and crude oil); and 21 dual recommendations covering exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and 3 other currencies and 1 basket of currencies. In 370 shows, a single recommendation records no corresponding comparison, because either only one analyst participated in the show or one of the analysts did not ultimately discuss the relevant asset. As noted in the previous section, such recommendations were excluded from the main analysis but are later considered in the robustness tests. A total of 28 observations were excluded as the underlying asset is unique (e.g., Bitcoin, VIX, luxury houses).
Observe from While among the asset classes the recommendations span all 5 categories, there are substantially more buy and sell recommendations than strong-buy, strong-sell, and hold recommendations.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which measures the correlation with the numbers from 1 to 5 (e.g., 1 stands for strong sell) corresponding to the fundamental and technical recommendations, is typically small. It is 0.05 for single stocks, 0.18 for the market index, 0.21 for equity sectors and non-U.S. indexes, 0.29 for bonds, and 0.38 for commodities. Treasury bill rate serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. To measure the performance of 10-year Treasuries recommendations, we employed two methods. First, the ten-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rates were used to calculate the price of a notional zero-coupon 10-year bond. Second, we employed the price of the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF. As the empirical evidence for the two methods is similar, we report the findings for the first approach.
Individual stocks: the empirical evidence
This section focuses exclusively on single-stock recommendations. The other asset classes will be analyzed in the next section. Consistent with the findings reported in the introduction, it is evident from Figure 2 that the fundamental analysts have not been successful in predicting stock returns. The mean raw returns during one, six, nine, and twelve months following sell recommendations are actually higher than the mean returns following buy recommendations. For the twelve-month horizon, the mean returns associated with sell and buy recommendations are 23.39% and 20.29%, respectively. The corresponding risk-adjusted figures are 2.38% and 1.87%. In contrast, the technical analysis reveals a rather strong return-recommendation relation. Focusing on the sixmonth horizon, the average returns are 3.65% (strong sell), 7.25% (sell), 11.77% (hold), 10.86% (buy) and 16.84% (strong buy). The risk-adjusted figures are -5.21% (strong sell), -1.78% (sell), 2.57% (hold), 1.82% (buy), and 5.46% (strong buy). Table 2 reports the relation between the investment average return, the recommendation category, and the investment horizon in more detail. Reported are the average returns for the five recommendation types. Moreover, as the classification for "all-buy" (buy and strong-buy recommendations) and "all-sell" recommendations (sell and strong-sell recommendations) is fairly unambiguous, we also report the returns corresponding to such "all" categories.
[Please insert Figure 2 here]
Starting with the fundamental analysts, sell recommendations are followed by higher average returns than buy recommendations for the one-, six-and nine-month horizons. For instance, for the nine-month horizon, sell (buy) recommendations record an 18.3% (13.7%) average return. A comparison of the strong-buy and strong-sell fundamental recommendations reveals a more appealing outlook. The return spreads between the two extreme categories are Nevertheless, our overall findings are consistent in that the return spreads between allbuy and all-sell fundamental recommendations are relatively small, given by 0.1%, 1.4%, 0.3%, -1.2% and 1.3%, respectively. Likewise, for the all-sell and all-buy fundamental recommendations, the Mann-Whitney test reveals that the return distributions are indistinguishable, implying that the fundamental analysis is comparable with random draws of recommendations.
In contrast, the technicians reveal impressive stock-picking skills. Their buy recommendations predict uniformly higher average returns, both raw and risk-adjusted, than their sell recommendations. For instance, for the nine-month horizon, buy and sell recommendations are associated with a 16.5% and 13.9% average raw return, respectively. The corresponding risk-adjusted figures are 2.4% and -0.6. Further, the return spreads between allbuy and all-sell recommendations are equal to 1.9%, 2.4%, 6.2%, 5.7% and 6.4% for the five horizons considered. Similar evidence emerges on the basis of risk-adjusted returns. The investment returns following all-buy recommendations are uniformly larger than those following all-sell recommendations. For example, the corresponding nine-month returns are -1.2% for allsell and 3.9% for all-buy. The superiority of technicians over fundamental analysts appears in all five time horizons. In all cases, the average returns corresponding to technical all-sell recommendations are lower than the fundamental all-sell recommendations and the average returns corresponding to technical all-buy recommendations are higher than the fundamental allbuy recommendations.
All the statistical tests pertaining to the technical recommendations are highly significant, indicating that the success of the technicians is not random. Specifically, among the technical recommendations, the Kruskal-Wallis statistic (which is a non-parametric test for the equality of the mean return distributions across all five recommendation categories) significantly rejects the null hypothesis of equal mean returns for the various categories of recommendations. Similarly, the Mann-Whitney statistic, which is a non-parametric test for the equality of all-buy and all-sell distributions, strongly rejects the null hypothesis, implying that the distribution of returns realized following all-buy recommendations is significantly different (shifted to the right) from that of all-sell recommendations.
[Please insert Table 2 
Cross-section analysis
Regression analysis is essential for studying the quality of recommendations further. In the context of analysts' recommendations, it has been shown that the firm size (Womack, 1996) , past return, volume, book-to-market ratio (Jegadeesh et al., 2004) , and industry affiliation (Boni and Womack, 2006) are associated with the performance of recommendations. In response, we run the following cross-section regression: 
where i is the stock-specific subscript; R i is the investment return; REC i describes the recommendation category (1 -strong sell, 5 -strong buy); ME i is the previous-year log of the market capitalization; BE i is the previous-year positive book value and zero otherwise; VOL i is the return volatility measured by daily returns over the year prior to the recommendation broadcast; VOLUME i is the log of the average daily trading volume over the year prior to the broadcast; 3 , 2 , 1 = j i R denote the returns during six months, one month and two to four months prior to the recommendation broadcast; ∆VOL i and ∆VOLUME i are, respectively, the changes in volatility and volume during the last three months relative to the whole year prior to the broadcast; Table 3 reports the regression evidence. We perform sixteen distinct tests. The dependent variable in most of the tests (unless otherwise noted) is the six-month return following the broadcast. Test 1 excludes all the control variables. Here, consistent with the previous analyses, the fundamental recommendations' (REC i ) coefficient is insignificant, while its technical counterpart is significantly positive (t = 6.82). Test 2 considers the past six-month return as a control variable. While the past return enters significantly, the technical recommendations' coefficient is still significantly positive (t = 5.52). Likewise, unreported regressions confirm that the technical recommendations are significantly positively correlated with past returns corresponding to horizons ranging from one to seven months. Nevertheless, trend following by itself does not capture the ability of technicians to deliver reasonably robust predictions.
Tests 3 also controls for size, book-to-market, volatility, and volume. The evidence supporting technical recommendations is still profound. Notice that our sample consists of large firms mostly belonging to the upper-size decile, with average market capitalization of 39 billion dollars, and medium book-to-market firms belonging to the low-mid book-to-market deciles (see Appendix C for the list of stocks). Thus, it may not be surprising that our sample of stocks does not exhibit effects related to size, volatility, or the book-to-market ratio. Indeed, all the additional control variables are insignificant.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
Test 4 further accounts for the past returns over various periods, change in volume and volatility in the last three months and earnings surprises, as well as controlling for the potential immediate impact of the recommendation broadcast on the stock return and trading volume.
Again, the fundamental recommendations do not display economic or statistical significance, whereas the technical recommendations are positively associated with future stock returns (t = 3.48).
Controlling for various past stock return variables does not capture the predictive power of technical recommendations. The return-recommendation relation is also not attributable to the direct short-term impact of the broadcasts on the stock prices and trading volume, even when the coefficients corresponding to these two variables are significant. While there is a significant immediate impact of recommendations on the stock price and trading volume, the predictive ability of technical recommendations persists long afterwards (see also the evolution of investment payoffs displayed in Figure 1 , which, conservatively, excludes the broadcast day in accumulating payoffs).
Tests 5 and 6 mirror Tests 3 and 4, respectively, except that the dependent variable is the six-month return adjusted to the Fama-French and momentum factors. Evidently, the predictive ability of technical recommendations is unexplained by common risk factors that could simultaneously affect the stock prices and the recommendation category.
Our sample consists of a relatively homogeneous group of "elite" analysts. This mitigates potential systematic biases involving analysts' experience and reputation (Graham, 1999; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam, 2006) as well as career concerns (Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005) . Moreover, Kumar (2010) shows that female analysts display a superior forecast ability due to the self-selection process. Presumably, those females who have superb abilities as analysts pursue a career in a male-dominated industry. Our sample contains about 90% male analysts among the fundamentalists and technicians across all the asset classes (see Table 1 ).
Thus, gender does not seem to represent a potential source of systematic bias.
Nevertheless, Test 7 implements a formal test accounting for analyst gender. The fundamental recommendations' coefficients are near zero and insignificant regardless of the analyst's gender. The technical recommendations' coefficients are relatively larger and highly significant (t = 5.13 for males and 3.47 for females). While the coefficient corresponding to female analysts is slightly larger (0.029 versus 0.024), the gender effects are altogether insignificant. In sum, the success of technical recommendations in predicting returns on individual stocks is not captured by the analyst's gender effect. Moreover, female technicians or fundamental analysts do not outperform their male counterparts.
While the dependent variable in Tests 1 through 7 is the stock return (raw or riskadjusted) over six months following the recommendation broadcast, we also examine one-, three, nine-and twelve-month investment returns following the broadcasts. Tests 8 through 11 report the empirical evidence. For all the investment horizons, the fundamental recommendations' coefficients are indistinguishable from zero, while their technical counterparts are positively significant.
The remainder tests in Table 3 display the robustness of the results focusing on the sixmonth returns. Test 12 excludes the hold category to avoid potential misclassification errors. Indeed, the difference between buy and sell recommendations is distinctive from the difference between hold and buy or hold and sell recommendations. Similarly, the difference between buy and sell recommendations is distinctive from the difference between buy and strong-buy and between sell and strong-sell recommendations.
Test 13 focuses on the all-buy and all-sell categories. As noted earlier, the all-buy category is composed of both buy and strong-buy recommendations, while the all-sell category is composed of both sell and strong-sell recommendations. The evidence again shows that the fundamental recommendations' coefficients are insignificant, while the technical recommendations' coefficients are highly significant (t = 5.73 and t = 4.14, respectively). That is, the results are robust to possible classification errors. They persist when the hold category and the distinctions between strong-buy and buy and between strong-sell and sell are excluded.
Tests 14 and 15 examine the sensitivity of the results to the presence of outliers. The dependent variable in Test 14 is the six-month return winsorised at 2.5%. In Test 15, we employ the quantile regression around the median (τ = 0.5), which is less sensitive to extreme observations than the OLS regression. In both cases, the technical recommendations' coefficients are highly significant (t = 5.90 and t = 3.44, respectively), suggesting that the stock-picking skills of technical analysts are not attributable to outliers. 
where R i is the six-month stock return (we consider both raw and risk-adjusted returns) and REC i describes the recommendation category (1 -strong sell, 5 -strong buy). We consider two specifications. In one, FIRM ij (j = 1,2,…,6) are dummies for six industries: mining, construction and manufacturing, utilities, trade, financial and administration, and services. The industry division is made according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code with the exception that the construction and the wholesale trade and administration sectors, for which we record fewer than ten observations, are merged with their closest-matching industries. In the second specification, FIRM ij (j = 1,2,3) are dummies for firms belonging to the bottom 30%, core 40% and top 30% of either the firm's size, the book-to-market ratio, the volatility or the past return.
[Please insert Table 4 here] Table 4 reports the results. Starting with the fundamental analysis, the recommendations do predict the future returns in the services industry. The mining coefficient is negatively significant, while all the other recommendation coefficients are generally insignificant. Moving to the technical front, excluding the mining industry, the analyst recommendations produce robust predictions based on the raw and risk-adjusted returns. The failure to predict the mining stock returns is consistent with the prominent inability of both technicians and fundamental analysts to predict commodity prices, as we show below. Table 4 reports the impact of firm characteristics on recommendations. As the sample is dominated by large firms, we attribute the 19 firms belonging to the bottom group to the core group. The coefficients corresponding to the size, book-to-market ratio, volatility, and past return groups of the fundamental recommendations are, for the most part, insignificant. This is consistent with the notion that fundamental recommendations display low power in predicting future returns across all the equity styles. In contrast, all the coefficients corresponding to the technical recommendations are highly significantly positive.
Panel B of

Examining recommendations among broader asset classes
Why are technical recommendations successful in predicting returns on individual stocks? One possibility is that technicians trade on private signals, as prescribed by Brown and Jennings (1989) , Blume et al. (1994) , and Zhu and Zhou (2009). In addition, as noted in the introduction, technicians can filter out insider buying and selling activities from the charts. If so, the essential hypothesis is that the success in predicting individual stock returns does not translate into robust predictions of broader asset returns.
The empirical evidence provides support for that hypothesis. In particular, Figure 4 
[Please insert Figure 4 here]
Briefly, Plots 4a through 4d show that both technicians and fundamental analysts are unable to predict the S&P 500 index, equity sectors and non-U.S. equity indexes, U.S. bonds and commodities. Conversely, Figure 4e shows that both fundamental and technical recommendations impressively predict future currency rates, with the most outstanding positively monotonic curve corresponding to the investment horizon of one year.
Likewise, Figure 5 presents the cumulative returns relative to the mean returns during the studied period for the five recommendation categories and for the various asset classes.
Consistent with the former analyses, there is no clear association between relative cumulative returns and recommendations for the S&P 500 index, equity sectors and non-U.S. equity indexes, bonds, and commodities. In contrast, both investment approaches are able to identify future trends in exchange rates.
[Please insert Figure 5 here]
The apparent success in predicting exchange rates should be interpreted with caution. To start with, only 21 dual recommendations on exchange rates were recorded. Moreover, past work supports the notion that the transparent monetary policies of central banks to keep interest rates low and improve liquidity could enhance the ability to predict future rates. For example, Szakmary and Mathur (1997) find that the profitability of technical rules in foreign exchange markets may be explained by a "leaning against the wind" policy of central banks. LeBaron (1999) and Sapp (2004) report an association between technical rules and central banks' interventions. Here we document similar predictive patterns among technicians and fundamental analysts even when the two schools of thought implement very different toolkits, typically leading to very different predictions.
The same line of reasoning, that is, central bank firm intervention, does not apply to the prediction of prices of ten-year bonds, as the prices of long-term bonds may be exposed to other market factors beyond the short-term interest rates. Indeed, the ten-year risk-free rates exhibit considerable volatility during the sample period, amounting to 6.66% in annual terms. Table 6 reports summary statistics similar to those exhibited in Table 2 but focusing on the broader asset classes. Staring with the market index, consistent with Figure 5a , there is no clear association between recommendations and subsequent returns. The null hypotheses that (i) the five recommendation categories have the same return distributions, (ii) returns corresponding to buy and strong-buy fundamental recommendations and sell and strong-sell fundamental recommendations have the same distribution and (iii) the same as (ii) but for technical recommendations are generally not rejected. When they are rejected, the difference is in the wrong direction as the mean returns corresponding to sell recommendations are higher than those corresponding to buy recommendations.
[Please insert Table 6 The apparent success in predicting individual stock returns is the exception rather the rule. In all the other asset classes, excluding the U.S. dollar, both technicians and fundamental analysts reveal no predictive ability. Our findings thus indicate that the markets corresponding to virtually all assets are efficient, yet inefficiency appears to exist among individual stocks.
Conclusion
This study employs a novel database from a TV broadcast in a head-to-head confrontation of the performance of fundamental analysts versus technicians to assess their economic value. The data are composed of fundamental and technical simultaneous recommendations for the same underlying assets with the same investment horizon. The unique setup of the broadcast, featuring synchronized dual recommendations, a great variety of asset classes and the presence of leading professionals, offers an ideal laboratory in which to assess the value of financial analysis.
Ultimately, both technicians and fundamental analysts are exposed to the same public information and their recommendations could differ due to the distinct toolkits applied.
The simultaneous broadcast equates analyst exposure to herding, eliminates time gap biases such as cross-herding among analysts, and allows one to control for the immediate shortterm effect of the broadcast itself. The high profile of the participating analysts levels the playing field, thereby mitigating the biases related to analysts' quality, experience, and career concerns.
In addition, the broad focus of the program and the comprehensive list of assets covered make our findings general and mitigate the concerns about illiquidity biases and exceptional observations. Consistent with the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis, the fundamental analysis reveals no ability whatsoever to predict future returns on all the assets examined, excluding the U.S. dollar. Surprisingly, the technicians exhibit a significant predicting ability of individual stock returns, which could point to market inefficiency even among the universe of the largest and most-traded stocks. For a start, trading individual stocks based on technical recommendations yields large payoffs even after accounting for reasonable transaction costs.
Moreover, such stock-picking ability is unaffected by controlling for common risk factors, the firm's characteristics, including past returns, industry effects, the analyst's gender, the potential immediate impact of the broadcast, and outliers.
However, the predictive ability of technicians characterizes individual stocks only (and the U.S. dollar). In contrast, returns on more general asset classes, including the market indexes, equity sectors and non-U.S. equity indexes, bonds, and commodities, are unpredictable. Such differential results support the notion that the predictive ability of technicians relies on the possession of proprietary investment toolkits. Considering the nature of technical analysis, one appealing explanation is that such toolkits enable their users to extract private information from informed buying and selling activities, which are more applicable to individual stocks and less so to broader asset classes. Of course, arbitrage capital is invested more in general assets and indexes, thereby eliminating abnormal profits, if there are any, from trading those assets. Min. Min.
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